Introduction
The adaptive expectations hypothesis was introduced by Cagan (1956) and Friedman (1957) as a plausible and empirically meaningful approach to modeling expectations of future variables in a world of uncertainty. Their apparent empirical success led to widespread utilization of the adaptive expectations hypothesis before it was ultimately swept away by the rational expectation revolution, initiated by Muth (1961) and advanced by Lucas (1976) and Sargent and Wallace (1975) . Rational expectations has the great advantage of providing optimal expectations; under the standard of optimality, adaptive expectations suffers by comparison and should be rejected.
One of the most salient implications of rational expectations is the critique of traditional policy making presented in Lucas (1976) . The traditional theory of economic policy is characterized as treating the time series process followed by the economy as fixed and invariant with respect to exogenous changes in policy. Under rational expectations, however, the forecast or expectation rule will be affected by policy changes and, if the economy is in turn affected by expectations, these will alter the time series process followed by the economy. Lucas provided examples of this phenomenon based on prominent macroeconomic models.
Our objective here is to reconsider the Lucas critique in the context of adaptive expectations. The starting point of our argument is Muth (1960) . In that paper Muth showed that adaptive expectations, with an appropriate adaptation parameter, are fully rational if the variable being forecasted follows an exogenous IMA(1,1) stochastic process, i.e. if the first difference of the variable is a first-order moving average process. Rational expectations, however, assumes that the true process generating the data is known, an assumption that many feel to be implausibly strong. Recently Honkapohja (1993, 2001 ) and Sargent (1999) have argued that adaptive expectations may be a reasonable, if not fully rational, forecast method when the true process is unknown.
We consider a simple expectations augmented Phillips curve model in which the monetary policy rule follows an unknown regime switching process. In a world in which the true data generating process is complex, economic agents can be expected to use simple underparameterized representations of the process to make their forecasts. By appropriately tuning the free parameters of the forecast rule, they can obtain the best forecast rule within a given class of underparameterized learning rules. That is, an appropriate bounded rationality assumption is that agents, in the terminology of Sargent (1999, Ch. 6) have "optimal misspecified beliefs." We choose Cagan-Friedman adaptive expectations for our underparameterized class of expectations because of their simplicity. Using this model, we are able to demonstrate vividly the scope for the Lucas critique to operate in a setting of bounded rationality. These findings suggest that the Lucas critique may play an important role under more generalized classes of underparameterized expectation functions.
Our central results are as follows. Even in the special case in which expectations do not affect realized inflation, so that inflation is exogenous, changes in the economic policy process may induce changes in the forecast rule and therefore in the stochastic process followed by other economic variables. Thus the Lucas critique has a range of validity when expectations are not fully rational, but formed adaptively. The reason is that the optimal choice of the adaptive expectations parameter γ may depend on the stochastic process followed by policy. However, this is not always the case. For some model parameters the optimal choice of γ makes it unresponsive to observed data (by setting it for maximal filtering). When this is the case, small changes in policy parameters have no effect on the expectation function and the Lucas critique does not apply.
When expectations have a nonzero effect on inflation, some new features emerge. We show how the size of the region in which the Lucas critique applies can be expanded as a consequence of feedback between agents' choices of learning rules. Further, the Nash equilibrium choice of γ may differ from the socially optimal setting. This arises because the feedback induces a forecast externality.
To attain optimal choices of adaptive parameters, agents can use simple real-time algorithms that gradually incorporate observed data. As an example, we consider the RPE (recursive prediction error) algorithm that estimates the value of γ that minimizes the mean squared prediction error. When parameters of the policy process shift, agents adjust their estimates of γ according to the algorithm, thereby converging to the equilibrium value corresponding to the current policy parameters. Our simulations show examples of parameter drift induced by gradual adjustment of expectations, in line with the intuition expressed by Lucas (1976, Sections 3-4) , along with cases in which expectations are unaffected by changes in policy. 
Model

Economic Structure
We consider a simple macroeconomic model, inspired by Lucas (1973) and Fischer (1977) , in which aggregate output is affected by unanticipated price level changes. Let aggregate supply be specified as follows: 
where m t denotes the nominal money stock in period t, and η t represents an exogenous white noise process with variance V ar(η).
Finally, the monetary authority determines the money stock according to the following policy rule: m
where µ t is a regime switching process defined as follows:
with probability 1 − ε ν t with probability ε , where 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 and ν t is an independently and identically distributed process with an arbitrary distribution having meanν and variance V ar(ν). Thus, apart from the random shocks, the money supply fully accommodates 
We remark that the structure (4) . This has the same form as (4) except that now there is a negative feedback from expected prices. The analysis of this paper applies equally well to this set-up. A special case of interest is if b = 0 so that demand follows an exogenous stochastic process, as would be appropriate in an open economy or for a monopolist with infinitely elastic demand. This leads to the zero feedback case analyzed in Section 3.
Expectation Formation
We turn now to the problem of how agents form inflation forecasts. Assume for convenience that at time t − 1 the whole history of data {π 
The standard rational expectations forecasting procedure assumes full knowledge of the true process generating π t , and the form of the optimal forecasting rule would be closely linked to that of the true process. We instead consider the problem of forecasting π t when the forecaster does not know the true data-generating process.
In contrast to the rational expectations procedure, we assume that the forecaster might misspecify the true process by using a forecast rule that is too simple to make fully-rational forecasts possible. To make our analysis transparent, the class of forecast rules we consider is a mild extension of the venerable adaptive expectations class introduced by Friedman and Cagan. In particular, we restrict attention to forecasts derived from the following one-parameter class:
In the case in which γ = 0, we interpret this sum as
Existence of the limit is shown below. For 0 < γ < 1 this class of forecasts is called exponential smoothing, and for γ = 0 it reduces to the sample mean. The forecasts (5) and (6) can be represented recursively by
,
is a nonstochastic gain sequence. For γ t = γ, where 0 < γ ≤ 1, we have β
).
This is a fixed gain rule, corresponding to (5), and gives the classic CaganFriedman adaptive expectations formula. For γ t = 1/t we obtain
which corresponds to (6), i.e., the sample average, where for convenience we now treat the system as starting at t = 0. This is known as a decreasing gain rule. Note also that this can be thought of as least squares learning when π indicates the responsiveness of the forecast rule to a time-varying conditional mean, while filtering refers to the ability of the forecast rule to eliminate data-induced noise in the forecasts. A high value of γ increases tracking, but sacrifices filtering. The choice γ = 0 represents maximal filtering with no tracking.
Equilibrium
We consider Nash equilibria of the model, in which all agents select a common value of γ that minimizes MSE. In particular, γ is a Nash equilibrium if it minimizes MSE for each agent, given the inflation process that arises when all other agents in the economy choose γ.
The equilibrium path of inflation expectations is determined as follows. If γ > 0, then inflation expectations satisfy π 
where θ = (1 + α)
. This set-up fits the standard Robbins-Monroe formulation for stochastic recursive algorithms. Applying these stochastic approximation results, 3 it can be shown that, for all initial β 0 , with probability one β t converges under (9) to the unique equilibrium of the associated ordinary differential equation
, where τ denotes notional time. Since E(µ t + η t ) =ν, we have β t →ν under (9) with probability one. In view of (6), it follows that β t =ν with probability one.
Zero Feedback Case: Theoretical Results
We begin by considering the case of α = 0, in which realized inflation is unaffected by inflation expectations. This eliminates feedback between agents' expectation formation decisions, allowing closed-form solutions for the Nash equilibrium to be obtained. The case of α > 0 is analyzed in the following section. 
Given α = 0, the inflation process is
Since Cov(η , we see that MSE is given by
In order to compute MSE for the case 0 < γ ≤ 1, we need the asymptotic moments of the stationary process implied by (7) and (10) . These are computed in the following lemma.
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Lemma 1. For the process defined by (7) and (10), we have
V ar(β
Using (11), (12) and (13), the MSE when 0 < γ ≤ 1 is given by
This leads to the following necessary first-order condition for the optimal choice γ * :
where
Necessary and sufficient conditions for nonzero γ * are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. γ * ∈ (0, 1) if and only if the following condition holds:
In this case, γ * is given implicitly by:
Now consider the MSE if γ = 0. Since θ = 1, we have, with probability one, that β
Hence when γ = 0, the MSE is given by MSE = V ar(µ t
Observe from (17) that when ε takes on a high value, associated with frequent switches in policy, agents select γ * = 0 in equilibrium. In this case, no attempt is made to learn about policy. Because policy changes frequently, policy shifts are tantamount to noise, and agents opt to filter noise out of their expectations by placing zero weight on past inflation observations. When the value of ε is low, in contrast, switches are less frequent, and agents find it beneficial to track the time-varying conditional mean of policy by setting γ * > 0. Thus, characteristics of the policy rule feed back on the agents' choice of learning rule, based on the relative benefits of filtering versus tracking.
Note further that the upper bound of allowable ε in (17) becomes smaller as V ar(η) grows relative to V ar(ν). Higher V ar(η) reflects an increase in background noise, which increases the attractiveness of filtering.
The theorem demonstrates that for a range of ε, a decline in ε leads agents to select higher values of the adaptive expectations parameter γ * . This relationship does not hold for all ε values, however. From (18) the following corollary is immediate.
Intuitively, as policy switches become very infrequent, the return to tracking them becomes small, and agents prefer to choose small values of γ * order to filter out noise. Full filtering emerges in the limit. It follows that the relationship between the persistence of policy and optimal tracking is nonmonotonic: as ε rises from zero, tracking first rises, then falls. We close this section by considering the implications for the Lucas Critique in the context of adaptive expectations. We have seen that when agents underparameterize the forecast rule by using adaptive expectations with an optimally chosen adaption parameter γ * , there are two regimes depending on the underlying exogenous stochastic process. Following Lucas (1976) we can consider the effect of exogenous changes in economic policy leading to changes in the π t process.
. Then changes in V ar(η), V ar(ν) or ε lead to changes in the Nash equilibrium forecast rule and the Lucas critique applies. However, if ε > 2/(
+ 3) then for sufficiently small changes in V ar(η), V ar(ν) or ε, the equilibrium rule remains γ * = 0 so that the forecast rule is not subject to the Lucas critique.
Corollary 2 shows that, depending on the other parameters, changes in parameters of the policy rule may or may not induce changes in the forecast rule. This result demonstrates that the Lucas critique may have a range of applicability within a setting of bounded rationality. More broadly, our findings reveal that the Lucas critique is not fundamentally tied to rational expectations. Once agents are allowed to vary the parameters of their learning rules in a purposeful way, the Lucas critique becomes salient even if rational expectations are impossible to acquire. The importance of the critique is then related to the degree of sensitivity of agents' parameter choices to the economic environment.
General Case
Feedbacks, Tracking and Inflation Persistence
We turn now to the general case, where α > 0 is considered. When α is positive, agents' choice of learning rule affects the inflation process, generating a feedback to the choice of learning rule. The complications introduced by this feedback make it difficult to obtain full analytical results, and thus we limit our discussion to a local existence proof and to numerical examples for a range of parameters.
To define the Nash equilibrium we must now distinguish between the gain parameterγ chosen by a representative agent and the value γ chosen by all other agents. For γ,γ ∈ (0, 1] the system is thus defined by
, where θ = 1/(1 + α) MSE(γ *
,γ).
As shown in the appendix, the theoretical results of the previous section carry over to the case of α > 0 sufficiently small. We have:
+ 3) then for all α > 0 sufficiently small there exists a Nash equilibrium with γ *
+ 3) then for all α > 0 sufficiently small there exists a Nash equilibrium with γ * = 0.
We remark that Theorem 2 also applies to the Muth "cobweb" model, described at the end of Section 2.1, with the condition "α > 0 sufficiently small" replaced by "b > 0 sufficiently small." Increased tracking has the added effect of introducing greater persistence into the inflation process. This is shown in Table 1 , which reports first order autocorrelation coefficients for simulated inflation data using the Nash equilibrium learning parameter.
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The α = 0 column indicates the autocorrelation introduced by the policy switching process itself, in the absence of any learning effects. These coefficients would be the same for the other α values if agents selected γ = 0. However, positive choices of γ * imply added inflation persistence. For ε = 0.1, increasing α to 1/4 leads the autocorrelation coefficient to rise by 10 percentage points, based on the rise in tracking by agents. This effect leads to a further rise of 14 percentage points when α is increased to 2/3. Results are similar for the other ε levels.
Learning Externalities
We close our examination of Nash equilibria by comparing the equilibrium choices γ * to the values that would be selected by a social planner who sought to minimize MSE. It can be verified that in the case with feedback, MSE/θ 2 is given by the right-hand-side of (14) In general the socially optimal choice of γ will not coincide with the Nash equilibrium value. for α = 0, since there are no feedbacks across agents' choices. As α rises, the private incentive to raise tracking increases faster than does the social incentive, and as a result the Nash equilibrium choices exceed the optimal levels. Here agents suboptimally overtrack the policy switches.
FIGURE 2 HERE
Real Time Adaptation to Change in Policy Rule
We have developed our analysis in an equilibrium setting, in which each agent chooses the adaptive expectations parameter γ optimally given the choices of others. There remains however the question of how agents actually attain the equilibrium value γ * . This issue can be resolved in a straightforward way by specifying a procedure that the agents can use to estimate the optimal γ. Equilibrium values would arise as limit points of such a procedure.
A number of plausible algorithms could be proposed for this purpose. We here provide a particularly natural account in the spirit of the econometric learning literature that has the additional virtue of highlighting the insights of Muth (1960) . Muth pointed out that adaptive expectations are fully rational in one specific case: if π t follows the process
where u t is white noise and −1 ≤ c ≤ 0, then a rational forecast of π t + 1 is given by adaptive expectations with parameter γ = 1 + c. In our model the inflation rate π t does not obey this process, but instead follows a complex regime switching process. Agents recognize that the class of adaptive forecasting rules is underparameterized relative to the true process, and so they seek the value of c that provides the best fitting model of ∆π t within the class (19). This is reminiscent of Friedman's (1957) approach in the context of the permanent income hypothesis.
Drawing on the adaptive learning literature (e.g. Evans and Honkapohja (2001)), we formulate this as a recursive algorithm in which agents each period update their estimate of the appropriate value of c based on the data available. Most of the literature focuses on least squares learning, but our problem here is somewhat more difficult because it requires estimation of an MA(1) (i.e. first-order moving average) process. Ljung and Söderström (1983) provide a convenient procedure, known as the RPE (recursive prediction error) algorithm, which aims to minimize the mean squared prediction error. If the true process were indeed (19), with the u t normally distributed, the RPE algorithm would provide an approximation to maximum likelihood estimation of c. In our setting the true model is not given by (19), and indeed the model (in the case with feedback) is self-referential. However, as emphasized in the adaptive learning literature, such estimators can often be expected to asymptotically converge to equilibrium values, even in misspecified self-referential models such as in the present setting.
In our model, with this set-up, inflation and inflation expectations are, as before, given by
except that now the expectations parameter γ t used by agents at t is based on their time t estimate of 1 + c:
where c t is estimated using the RPE algorithm. Details of the RPE algorithm are given in the Appendix. We here discuss the results of numerical calculations based on this algorithm. Numerical simulations, for a variety of model settings, appear to confirm that γ t → γ * as t → ∞. This is true both for parameter regions in which equilibrium γ * > 0 and for regions in which γ * = 0. In the latter case we observe c t → −1 so that γ t → 0. Thus this approach appears to provide a plausible account of how agents would come to coordinate on the Nash equilibrium value of γ. This approach is also able to indicate how agents, using this algorithm, will converge to a new value of γ * following a change in the monetary policy rule.
FIGURE 3 HERE
In Figure 3 we illustrate how agents, using the RPE estimator to choose γ, would be able to adapt to monetary policy changes, indexed by changes in the key parameter ε. For this simulation we choose α = 0.25 (i.e., θ = 1/1.25), V ar(ν) = 0.2 and V ar(η) = 0.025. In addition we choose the RPE algorithm gain sequence to yield very slow adaptation to changes in the policy rule (see the Appendix for details). This is convenient for illustrative purposes because it allows the convergence of the system to be clearly seen, showing slow systematic adaptation to policy-rule changes. Initially the policy rule is set to ε = 0.10. We begin the system near the equilibrium value γ * = 0.805. At time t = 100, 000 the policy rule is changed to ε = 0.85 and at t = 175, 000 it is changed to ε = 0.75. For both of these levels of ε the equilibrium value is γ * = 0. Finally, at t = 250, 000 the value of ε is reduced to ε = 0.50, with equilibrium value γ * = 0.602. We emphasize that the detailed specification is for illustrative purposes only; alternative settings would allow for a noisier but more rapid adaptation within a more realistic time scale.
It is apparent from Figure 3 that agents systematically adjust their expectations parameter γ over time toward the equilibrium value given by theory. This framework thus provides an explicit account of how agents, by seeking to use the best fitting model within an underparameterized class, will alter their forecast rule appropriately in response to changes in the monetary policy rule, illustrating the operation of the Lucas critique in a bounded rationality framework. In particular, Figure 3 depicts instances of gradual expectations adjustment in response to policy changes. This captures Lucas' intuition (1976, Sections 3-4) that parameter drift may result from the "adaptation of the decision rules of agents to the changing character of the series they are trying to forecast." Also illustrated, by the change from ε = 0.85 to ε = 0.75, is the local nonapplicability of the Lucas critique within the region where agents' forecast rules fully filter the data.
Conclusion
We have considered a simple monetary model in which agents are faced with a stochastic policy process which occasionally undergoes shifts in the mean. While the agents may have a rough idea that the system is time-varying, they are still unable to model explicitly the regime-switching process; as a consequence, they rely on simple forecast rules that underparameterize the true process. In particular we have considered the implications of agents' using exponential smoothing forecasts with an optimally chosen smoothing parameter 1 − γ. For 0 < γ ≤ 1 this is the traditional adaptive expectations formula and for γ = 0 it reduces to the sample mean. Even if the time variations of the mean are small, provided regime switches occur infrequently it will benefit agents to use an adaptive expectations forecast with 0 < γ < 1 rather than setting γ = 0 as would be optimal in the absence of regime switches. However if regime switches occur sufficiently frequently, then the choice γ = 0 is optimal because the importance of filtering then dominates.
We obtain simple analytical results for a version of the model in which inflation follows an exogenous stochastic process. Even in this setting we can illustrate the basic implications for the Lucas critique of the use of underparameterized forecasting models with optimally chosen parameters. Provided the exogenous and policy parameter settings satisfy an appropriate condition, adaptive expectations with a choice of 0 < γ < 1 will be optimal and in this region the Lucas critique operates with (optimally chosen) adaptive expectations for the same reason that it applies with rational expectations. However, if this condition fails, then full filtering with γ = 0 is optimal within our class of forecast rules, and the Lucas critique does not apply for small changes in parameter setting.
Additional features arise when inflation is affected endogenously by the learning process. The feedback from expectations in this setting expands the parameter region within which the Lucas critique applies. The self-referential aspect also induces a forecast externality which, in the case 0 < γ < 1, moves the Nash equilibrium value of γ away from the socially optimal value.
In the language of control theory, adaptive expectations is a simple example of a constant gain algorithm employed to track an unknown time-varying system.
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Using recursive identification techniques from the engineering literature, we also show how agents would be able to determine the best gain parameter to employ, where "best" is measured in terms of mean square prediction error, and we illustrate convergence of this procedure to the Nash equilibrium value of γ.
Our results explore the implications of adopting this kind of algorithm in underparameterized environments. A key insight of rational expectations and the Lucas critique, that the expectations parameters depend on the parameters of the underlying stochastic process, carries over to underparameterized models. However underparameterization can also result in regions of the parameter space within which the Lucas critique does not locally apply. Exploring the generality of these results, in more elaborate frameworks, would be of considerable interest and is left to future research. Setting θ = 1 and solving these five equations simultaneously, we obtain (12) and (13) 
Proof of Lemma 2 and Theorem 1. Let us establish that the second-order condition for a MSE minimum is satisfied globally. Clearly, the first term in (15) is strictly increasing in γ. As for the second term, note that
The term in brackets is strictly positive, as can be established by minimizing the term with respect to γ. Thus −εΨ(γ) is increasing in γ as well and (15) 
We first show that MSE is a smooth function of γ andγ for all γ,γ ∈ [0, 1] and for all θ in some neighborhood of θ = 1. From (21),(20) andβ
it is straightforward to obtain the following equations for second moments (without loss of generality we set means equal to 0): can be written as the first three elements of a 12x1 moment vector M which are jointly determined by the equation R(θ, γ,γ)M = s(γ,γ), where R is 12x12 and s is 12x1. Furthermore, R and s are smooth functions and it can be verified that R is invertible in a neighborhood of θ = 1 for all γ,γ ∈ [0, 1] so that M = M(θ, γ,γ) is well defined and smooth in a neighborhood of θ = 1 for all γ,γ ∈ [0, 1]. The MSE is given by MSE = u(θ, γ)+w(θ) M (θ, γ,γ) ≡ P (θ, γ,γ), where w(θ) = (−2θ, −2(1 − θ), 1, 0, ..., 0). It can be seen that P (1, γ,γ) is independent of γ and is given by the expression for MSE given in Section 3.
Clearly P is smooth for all γ,γ ∈ [0, 1] and for all θ in some neighborhood of θ = 1 and from Section 3 P 3 3 (θ, γ, γ), since P (1, γ,γ) independent of γ implies P 3 2
(1, γ, γ) = 0 for all γ, and since P 3 3
(1,γ,γ) > 0. It remains to show that P by filtering it through the current estimate of the MA(1) lag polynomial, a step known to give improved convergence properties. As is standard in MA(1) estimation, we also impose the invertibility condition −1 ≤ c t ≤ 1. That is, if c t computed by the above algorithm is less than −1 (more than 1) it is replaced by −1 (by 1). Note that c = −1 corresponds to the case γ = 0. 
